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24 January 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Tweedy

SUBJECT: Proposal to Terminate the Position  
of DCI China Coordinator

The coming of age of China as an intelligence target of top priority and the current proposed reorganization of the Intelligence Community call into question the future utility of the position of DCI China Coordinator and of the interagency mechanism under him, the China Intelligence Activities Coordination Group (CIACG).

The position of DCI China Coordinator was established in 1965 in the wake of China's first nuclear experiment and in response to the then DCI's wish to appoint a senior officer to a China function which would be clearly identifiable within the Government. This duty devolved upon [redacted] [redacted], the then Chairman of USIB's Critical Collection Problems Committee. [redacted] discharged the China Coordinator duties for over two years in addition to his other responsibilities. His work in the China field was focused on cataloguing the various intelligence assets and programs targeted on that country, in stimulating interest within the Community and in encouraging the allocation to China of additional collection resources.

[redacted]

the duties of China Coordinator. [redacted] thereafter placed much reduced stress on China in the CCPC. [redacted] major contribution during his two-year tour in the job was the preparation and coordination of two studies published under USIB auspices, one on Chinese Communist advanced weapons and US intelligence capabilities, and the other on warning

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capabilities against strategic attack by China. In addition, he found opportunities to assist in creating better communications among collectors and among analysts in the China field.

Final coordination and publication of the strategic warning study took place in January 1971 after the job of DCI China Coordinator had been passed on to [redacted] 25X  
[redacted] Prior to [redacted] transfer to senior staff duties in the DDI, it was suggested and proposed to the DCI that since the position had never actually demanded the full time of the incumbent officer such continuing occasional duties as might be called for could well be discharged by [redacted] 25X  
from his desk in DDI/SRS. The Director did not accept this proposal and expressed the wish that the position be maintained and that a qualified officer be appointed to it. This was done and [redacted] took over from [redacted] in 25X  
November 1970.

Since that time much has happened in the China field. Most significant have been the July 1971 announcement of President Nixon's intention to visit Peking and the September United Nations action in voting Peking in and Taipei out of the world body. These two events have meant that China has received first-hand attention at the very highest levels of the Administration and in the bureaucracy. Actions have become the immediate responsibility of command-line officers throughout the Government and particularly within the Intelligence Community. The DCI China Coordinator has had an understandably restricted role in these circumstances and the influence in the Community of his relatively low-level committee has been minimal. On a selective basis the DCI China Coordinator has pointed out areas within which some improvements in collection or analysis might be made, but he has been careful not to call into question the command authority of program managers and other responsible officers, both in CIA and without. His anomalous role as the only USIB-blessed organism having a geographical rather than a functional orientation has placed him potentially in the path of almost every other duly constituted reviewing and advisory element in the Community. His experience over the past few months indicates that with the

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China priority nailed to the masthead by political developments there is no doubt that the regularly constituted USIB functional groups can and will deal professionally and most effectively with China problems as they arise. They have in fact been doing so for at least the past three years.

The DCI China Coordinator has undoubtedly served a useful function. At the least, it has given evidence to the Intelligence Community that the DCI accorded China a special niche among his many major tasks and problems and has thereby kept some heat on the Community at times when other priorities tended to get the lion's share of attention and resources. The President's initiative toward China, however, is a stimulus to action and attention of enormously greater impact, and its effects will most likely be permanent. It seems quite probable that this new situation will be reflected in the work of the newly constituted committees and bodies created as a consequence of the White House ordered intelligence reorganization.

This brief review of the past and present of the position of DCI China Coordinator indicates that events have overtaken its usefulness. It should be phased out and its residual functions, if any, assigned to other USIB bodies. An early termination date should be considered.



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10 November 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Announcement of Designation of [ ]  
as DCI China Intelligence Activities  
Coordinator

1. The job of Coordinator of the China Intelligence Activities was established in 1965 as a result of pressure from the then Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, General Maxwell Taylor, who felt the need of a single place in the community knowledgeable of all intelligence activities aimed against China.

2. [ ] was assigned to this position in an individual capacity (and not as Chairman of the CCPC). [ ] did a very creditable job of developing an inventory and assessment of all activity (collection, processing and analytical) aimed against China. The ad hoc committee which he chaired issued a number of papers summarizing and evaluating the effort against China. It also formulated a statement of the objectives of the intelligence effort in China against which the achievements or inadequacies of this effort can be evaluated.

[ ]  
to take [ ] place. The thought at that point was that [ ] had completed an impressive staff exercise in establishing the totality of the intelligence effort against China. It was thought that the effort would benefit from the guidance of an individual with considerable personal and substantive experience in the area. During the approximately 18 months of [ ] incumbency the focus was primarily on an attempt to evaluate and improve the community's coverage of advanced weapons development in China and, more recently, the American early warning capabilities as regards military initiative by the Chinese.

4. [ ] has been recently assigned to fill an important vacancy in CIA and [ ] is being assigned as his

X1 replacement.  has served in the Far East a number

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/s/ John A. Bross

JOHN A. BROSS  
D/DCI/NIPE

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